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ECONOMICS AND JURISPRUDENCE
A lecture delivered by the late Justice Win. H. Timlin of the WIsconsin Supreme Court to the students of Marquette University College of
Law.
JUSTICE W. H. TIMLIN
of the Wisconsin Supreme Court

An article, entitled "Economics from a Legal Standpoint," in
the American Law Rez4ew, discusses somewhat superficially the
lack of cooperation between the lawyer and the economist in the
solution of present problems, and the author ventures the opinion
that: "Relief from this situation might be secured by having
our economists become lawyers and our lawyers economists."
But he regards this as hopeless because of the fact that a complete mastery of either science is now out of the question.
Economics and .urisprudence2 is the title of a little book found
in the Law Library at Madison and is, I believe, the only book
on this topic in that great law library. Here again the discussion
is very vague and general, instances and illustrations are lacking,
and it is not made certain what the writer included within either
term, economics or jurisprudence. In the Cr0iminal Law Maga142 Am. L. R. 379;

2Address

by H. C. Adams Pamph.
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there is an essay by Frances Wharton, entitled "Political
Economy and Criminal Law," showing the attitude of contemporary English judges toward Adam Smith's work on political
economy. This is well worth reading.
At the November, 1878, meeting of the New York State Bar
Association, Mr. W. M. Ivins, of Brooklyn, read an essay upon
jurisprudence and political economy, which also will repay
perusal, and in which he briefly outlines the objects and limits
of political economy, the object and limits of jurisprudence, and
discusses the relations between law and political economy and
asserts that no English writer, economist or jurist, has done
anything systematic in this field. He does not, however, distinguish between jurisprudence and law, nor between economics
and political economy, nor consider separately the viewpoint of
the legislator, the judge and the lawyer. Heron's History of
Jurisprudence contains much that is entertaining and instructive
upon this subject. The economists and jurists of continental
Europe have given this matter more attention, as Bodin, Rivet,
and Bechaud, in France, Von Mohl, Dankwardt, and Endemann,
in Germany, and Vico and Romagnosi in Italy. Economists
generally seem to be more sanguine of the utility to the lawyer
of economic studies than the lawyers are, but the former usually
fail to distinguish the function of the legislator from that of the
judge, or the duties of the judge from those of the lawyer, and
their discussions upon the relation of economics to law are often
too vague and general to be of much practical use. The great
value of economic knowledge to the legislator is obvious and
has been long recognized. Those of us who cannot read Greek
can get the oldest expressions of opinion on the relation of
political economy to legislation from Newman's Politics of Aristotle, and the relation of political economy to legislation is recognized and discussed more or less in Sidgwick, Seligman, Jevons,
Ely, Carey and other writers on economics, and also in several
chapters of Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations, particularly the
chapter on the expense of justice, that on taxation, and that on
the expense of public works for facilitating commerce. Special
examination and discussion of economics in its relation to legislation and jurisprudence will be found in Jevons' book on The
State in Its Relation to Labor, Adams on The Relation of the
State to Industrial Action, Farrer on The State in Its Relation
8 Law Pamph., vol. 1. '3 Crim. Law Mag. i.
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to Trade, Brentano on The Relation of Labor to the Law of
Today, Hoffman on The Sphere of the State, Stimson on Labor
in Its Relation to Law, and doubtless elsewhere. The relation
between political economy and legislation affecting the finances
of the state is indeed so obvious and necessary that every person
of good sense, although he never opened a book on political
economy, and knows nothing of it as a science, is, nevertheless,
influenced by its rules and principles in giving or withholding
assent to such legislation. In such case he gives or withholds
his assent to legislation affecting the finances of the state upon
a priori reasoning, or upon grounds of personal experience, or
upon knowledge otherwise acquired, identical with the proper
knowledge of, or deductions from, the recognized tenets of political economy. He may be often wrong, as economists are; he
would be better fitted for his task were he a more learned and
competent economist, but so far as he is able to observe and
understand these economic phenomena he is necessarily guided
by them because the nature of the questions under consideration
suggest just such inquiries and invite just such comparisons.
But the viewpoint of the interpreter of law and also that of the
student of law is very different from that of the legislator and
the relation of economics to law in their fields of labor less
obvious. The first difficulty inheres in the fact that for the purpose of study and investigation the great body of the law has
never been successfully analyzed or classified except with reference to the objects acted upon or regulated. Such was the
method of the institutes of Justinian and of Hale and of Blackstone, and of others who have made the attempt; covering substantially the following classification, but not in this exact order:
(I) The laws relating to institutions, such as establish and define
the creation and powers of courts, legislatures, executive and
administrative officers, municipalities and their officers so far as
they are governmental agencies, and other like institutions together constituting the state. (2) The law of persons, such as
status, citizenship, domestic relations, marriage and divorce, relation of guardian and ward, and includes generally those laws
which affect the distinctions between men and the relations which
exist between them. (3) Laws which relate to property or things.
(4) Laws relating to obligations, contractual or imposed by law
independent of contract. (5) The law of pleading and procedure
regulating actions and defenses. (6) The criminal law or the
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law of public wrongs having for its object the prevention and
punishment of crime.
This classification does not follow with exactness that of the
Institutes or that of Blackstone with reference to the number of
subdivisions, or the topics grouped in a particular subdivision,
but does substantially conform to their general plan and to the
revised statutes of Wisconsin and also to those similar statutes
of most of the states of the union in classifying laws with reference to the object acted upon or regulated. The same general
plan is found in the Code Napoleon and in the new German
Civil Code of January i, i9oo. On this plan of classifying laws
according to the object affected or regulated all our commentaries
and text-books on the law and all our legal encyclopaedias are
written, merely carrying this general plan into more minute subdivisions. Such, for example, are Parsons on Contracts, Black
on Judgments, Cooley on Torts, Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, Washburn on Real Property,and so on. It will be readily
seen that this scheme of analysis and classification does not adapt
itself very readily to any investigation of the relation of economics
to existing law. This mode of classification applied to other sciences has been denounced as one justified only by weakness of
understanding, but it is probably the only practical plan with
respect to law. In the study of the law we are, therefore, examining a body of existing rules classified with reference to the
objects affected or acted upon by such rules, and the method of
study is usually inductive, historical or analytical, while in economics we observe certain facts and tendencies, certain ever
present or constantly recurring phenomena, ascertain their causes
and deduce therefrom certain rules which we call laws. "The
economic facts (laws?) we find existing are the result of causes
between which and them the connection is constant and invariable.
It is then the constant relations exhibited in economic phenomena
that we have in view when we speak of the laws of the phenomena of wealth and in the exposition of those laws consists
the science of political economy (economics?). It is to be remembered that economic laws are tendencies, not actual descriptions of any given conditions in this or that place." 4 In the one
case we think of law as a command to which persons and things
must conform; in the other as the cause of conformity. Methods
of investigation and study are deductive, as in philosophy or
4

Mills Political Economy by Laughlin, 176.
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mathematics, where we begin with axiomatic premises and carry
on therefrom a process of reasoning unaided by any outside or
collateral tests and so arrive at or seek to arrive at the truth; or
the method may be inductive as where we begin with the observation of particulars, noting their similarity and consonance and
finally derive or attempt to derive therefrom the cause and the
law or rule governing the existence and concurrence of their
phenomena. Sciences are called positive or exact when induction
and deduction alternate in their presentation and examination.
Deduction is the principal mode of study of social economics,
although not the sole method. Induction is the principal method
in law, although not the sole method. Still another obstacle rests
in the ordinary weakness of economists as lawyers and that of
lawyers as economists. Without pretending to any special distinction in either branch of knowledge I will attempt to trace
historically and analytically in part the relation of social or
natural economics to existing law.
For the purpose of this discussion let us distinguish between
legislation, jurisprudence and law, and consider only the latter
as indicating that vast body of existing rules declared, maintained
or enforced by a sovereign state. Let us further narrow the discussion by considering economics to be capable of division into
political economy and natural or social economy; the former
treating of the finances and property of the state and indeed all
of the fiscal or the trade relations of the state with persons or
with other states, including taxation, coinage, currency, tariffs
and the expenses of administering government; and the latter
as treating of the production, exchange and distribution of wealth
by those persons so engaged. This science, says Jevons, "rests
upon a few notions of an apparently simple character. Utility,
wealth, value, commodity, labor, land, capital, are the elements
of the subject and whoever has a thorough comprehension of
their nature must possess or be soon able to acquire a knowledge
of the whole science." Having thus eliminated political economy
as above defined, and also having eliminated economic science
generally so far as the same relates to proposed legislation and
also in its relation to the broad term jurisprudence, we will be
able to examine more accurately the relation of social economics
to existing law. The utility of this further investigation will
consist in its aid to the understanding of the law. For the reason
of the law is the life of the law; and he who best understands
the causes and reasons of legal rules will, other things being
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equal, best understand the law. Notwithstanding that economic
laws are few and simple and the body of legal rules vast and
complicated, they have the same origin or starting point. For the
bases of economics and the origin and bases of law are human
desires, some natural, imperious and all controlling, as the desire
to exist or the desire for food and other necessaries of existence;
others secondary, as the desire for comfort, for art or ornamentation, and still others acquired, as the desire for certain
luxuries. Customs conform to desires for the sufficient reason
that they are voluntary regulations. Customs grow into law by
legislative enactment or judicial recognition, and thus desires become rights, the masterful and paramount desires first, and the
subordinate desires later. "Legal history is really a handmaid
to economic history ; legal development is inexplicable apart from
economic forces. The economic fact in this sense is the cause,
the legal situation is the result." ' The economic cause precedes
the custom and produces it, precedes the law and causes it, except
in those comparatively few instances where neither the custom
nor the law relates to the creation, production, enjoyment or distribution of wealth within the economic significance of these
terms. But great and controlling as economic considerations,
rules and principles are in the formation of law, it would be
exaggeration to claim that they alone ultimately determine the
form and character of the legal rule. In the infancy of the law
economic influences, while fairly discernable, are comparatively
weak and are deflected and modified by religious influences or
tribal or national customs not economic, or it may be by superstitions, but the economic cause is never wholly overcome and
is always a factor in the production of legal rules.
Since the earliest days up to and at the present time religions,
ethics, customs, prejudices, climatic and geographical conditions,
and to a less, but wholly exaggerated extent, racial traits enter
largely into the making and somewhat into the interpretation of
laws. It would be erroneous to say the law is in any age instigated
solely by economic considerations. Systems of law are always
relative to the epoch of history at which they appear and therefore in a commercial and industrial age economic considerations
are usually paramount in the formation and in the interpretation
of laws. Ethical considerations generally enter more largely into
the interpretation and application of laws than into their enact5 Seligman Principles of Pol. Economy, pp. 31,

32.
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ment or origin, but this is a variable factor and what the judge
might consider ethical in an immature social condition or in a
religious, military or chivalric age might not be so considered in
a commercial and industrial age and vice versa. Nor is the
completed law always the product of intelligent design on the
part of the people or the law makers of any epoch. It is in some
of its manifestations like language, the sub-conscious product of
human intelligence, human sentiment and human desires. "It
cannot be derived solely from interest as by Epicurus, from fear
as by Hobbes, or from necessity as by Machiavelli and Spinoza." 6
"However hostile or masterful the interests and, passions of individuals, classes and nations may seem to be in regard to it, they
are in fact but the instruments by which it builds up its empire."
The completed law is not always the result of conscious or deliberate intention on the part of the people or on the part of the
law makers. Laws made for one purpose often come to subserve
a wholly different purpose. Witness the fourteenth amendment
to the federal constitution and the English statute of uses (Washburn on R. P., ch. 56). The dominant cause of this curious
phase of law will be referred to later.
But, notwithstanding the existing law is the product of many
factors, we may, with advantage to ourselves, trace historically
the force and effect thereon of social economics, that most potent
and persistent of all its factors. Even a superficial examination
of the earliest laws, such as Deuteronomy or the laws of the
Saxon invaders of Britain, discloses that the first and paramount
idea of the youth of law is the repression of violence and disorder
and the institution or regulation of religion and the privileges of
the priesthood. This last feature is in itself, to the mere statesman, but an effective mode of maintaining order and suppressing
violence or crime. In Deuteronomy, for illustration, persons
guilty of murder are to be given over to the wrath of the kinsmen
of the victim, but cities of refuge are established to which one
guilty of involuntary homicide may fly and so escape from the
kinsmen. Adultery and rape are forbidden, false witnesses are
punished, all executions are participated in by the whole tribe,
the witness against the guilty person striking the first blow. The
shrewdness of this last in its tendency to prevent factional subdivision and internecine strife is noteworthy. Idolatry, which is
also treason in a theocracy, is to be punished by death. The
6

Blackwood's Philos. Classics.
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domestic relations are regulated; trial by judges recognized as
existing; an appeal from the decision of local judges to be heard
by the priests of the Levitical race and the judge at some appointed place; the existence of the right of property is recognized as a matter of course; not thought necessary to be established or created by law, but existing anterior to and independent
of the law; and the regulations respecting weights and measures
also show that some sort of trade or exchange existed. This law
approves thrift, but commands liberality, provides against too
great accumulations of wealth by periodical partial distribution,
recognizes slavery as existing by provisions relating to manumission and is wholly adapted to a tribe of herdsmen and farmers.
Priests and Levites should not have wealth, but should receive
from the people annual tithes or dues; and to modernize the
expression, multimillionaires, or those having a plurality of wives
are not eligible to the highest office. An awful curse is launched
against those who will not hear the voice of the Lord and keep
and observe these laws. "The dooms of King Ethelbert established in the days of Augustine," 7 as the earliest Saxon laws are
entitled, first provide for the property and privileges of the
bishops and clergy and then declare a series of fines or compensation to the kinsmen of the murdered or to the wounded person
for homicides and wounds reading something like a modern accident insurance policy. "If an ear be struck off let bot be made
with twelve shillings. If an eye be struck out let bot be made with
fifty shillings; if a thumb be struck off, twenty shillings; if the
thumb nail be off let bot be made with three shillings." Like bot
was to be made for rape, adultery or kidnapping. The right of
property is also recognized as existing anterior to and independent
of law because no statute expressly creates it or regulates it.
Contracts and obligations are known, as where this law says:
"If a man buy a maiden with cattle let the bargain stand if it be
without guile. But if there be guile let him bring her home again
and let his property be restored to him." Trade there was, or
there would have been no shillings. Without laws relating to
contract there could have been no trade. But from what indirect
and slight expressions in the written laws are we obliged to infer
this! But it is certain that these important matters on which the
food supply and indeed the life of the nation depended were not
without regulation. The words of all early written law are preg7Germs

and Development of the Laws of England. Stearns.
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nant with recognition of an underlying unwritten economic system
then in force. And system presupposes order and rule. The
dooms of King Ine of the West Saxons, the laws of Kings Alfred,
Ethelred and Canute are similar; recognizing property, contract,
slavery and status as existing conditions, not creating but slightly
regulating them. The regulation and establishment of religion
with the rights of the priesthood and the restrictions of violence
and disorder constitute the main body of such laws. "The dooms
of King Alfred" begin by Alfred and his witan enacting the ten
commandments which were given to Moses, and in other respects
borrow from the Jewish law. If one sold his daughter to servitude she should not be treated as other female slaves, in that he
ought not sell her away among a strange folk. This king was
evidently a person of some sagacity, and I select this quaint piece
of good counsel which legislators and judges of the supreme court
might well abide: "I, then, Alfred the king, gathered these
together and commanded many of those to be written which our
forefathers held (those which to me seemed good) and many of
these which seemed to me not good I rejected them by the counsel
of my witan, and in other wise commended them to be holden;
for I durst not venture to set down in writing much of my own
for it was unknown to me what of it would please those who
should come after us."
It is particularly noticeable that the right to hold property, to
make contracts or to engage in trade is not attempted to be conferred by law, but recognized as conditions existing prior to the
law. "Thou shalt not steal" as clearly recognizes the right of
property existing prior to this early law as does the commandment, "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's goods." Whence did
the owner or possessor derive the right to have against him who
steals; and what law made those goods "thy neighbor's goods ?"
The fragments which have come down to us from the twelve
tables of the Roman Law have these same general features, but
the religious element is not so paramount and property and trade
regulations somewhat more pronounced. This word "property"
is used popularly to designate the object or thing owned, but in
the law the word means the right of the owner to this object.
"Property is the right of any person to possess, use, enjoy and
dispose of a thing." As we have seen, in the earliest laws we
find no mandate that one shall have a right to possess, use, enjoy
sAndrews' American Law, sec. 59.
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or dispose of the objects of wealth which he has created by his
industry or captured by his prowess. This, I believe, is because
the right of property began as a natural right asserted by the
possessor or possessors and maintained by his or their strength
and skill, as the eagle or the lion defends his right to his prey or
the bee to its store of honey, the savage to the possession of his
weapons, or the child to that of his toys. In this sense the right
of property is a natural right and antecedent to all law. Custom,
the forerunner of primitive law, must have shaped itself into
crude rules respecting what should constitute a first claim or
taking, and the interest of the community must have enforced
with some regularity the observance of such rules.
I can remember distinctly that among the frontier settlers in
Wisconsin, if a hunter shot a deer and wounded him, and the deer
ran away, pursued by the hunter, but leaving no trail of blood,
another hunter meeting this fleeing deer, might shoot it, and
it was his property; but if after the first shot the deer left a trail
of blood, the first hunter was entitled to follow that deer and take
it from any other hunter who might have met and killed the
fleeing deer. I remember the discussions upon this custom and
the care with which it was observed, and yet the only sanction
that I know of for the custom was public opinion, which would
justify and uphold the quarrel of the hunter so entitled to the
deer.
So that even at the primitive stage of statute making
represented by the laws of the Jews or the Saxons above referred
to, the right of property had become at least an established
custom, and laws preventive of tumult and disorder with some
regulations of what was considered abuses of the right of property
in cases peculiarly liable to abuse, as in the case of property in
slaves, was all the written law that was considered necessary. In
these early stages of law economic influences are fairly discernible
in the laws relating to property contract and trade, which rights
rest strictly upon economic bases whether the property was the
spoil of battle, the reward of labor or the proceeds of purchase
or inheritance. Whether from policy or from mere casual omission the written law contains certain recognition and but slight
regulation of trade or industry. But I believe there was a reason
for this. In its beginning the written law is restrictive only.
"Thou shalt not," is often its language; always its spirit. In
items and in mass it is written from the viewpoint that the persons
subject to the law may follow their desires and inclinations except
in those particulars forbidden by the law. This left economic
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relations agd customs largely unaffected by the written law. The
more ample effect of economic rules or principles in the formation
and interpretation of law belongs to a later stage of legal development in which the social fabric and the state are organized upon
an industrial plan. Property which the law regards as the right
to a thing, social economics looks upon as the thing itself and
considers the word synonymous with goods or wealth, as the
product of labor, or the joint product of labor and capital, belonging to the producer thereof because he produced it. Trade
or exchange, both law and economics regard as an indispensable
element of the enjoyment, use and distribution of wealth, contract
as an indispensable feature of production, use and distribution.
Social economy considers and classifies not men or things, but
functions, in the production and distribution of wealth. Therefore it says there are producers and consumers of wealth, although every man is a consumer and nearly every man is in some
degree a producer. It ascertains that there are the functions of
labor, capital and management, carriage and storage, sale and
exchange, in the production and distribution of wealth, recognizing that the same person at the same time or in succession may
perform one or two or all of these functions. It recognizes that
men labor for rewards and that capital is the accumulated or
stored up product of former labor, that management, merchandising, the exercise of skill, trade, and transportation, are each a
species of labor and that without assured reward certainly and
permanently secured by law, all production beyond what was
necessary to satisfy present craving or present and immediately
pressing necessities would cease, as has sometimes happened in
periods of anarchy, which are, if long continued, always associated
with or followed by famine. The legal rules which the law calls
property, therefore, secure labor in the possession of the reward
of labor. It was necessary and fundamental that the law should
recognize and uphold the right of property in order that this
economic condition, essential to human welfare, should exist or
continue. If one could not be assured by law of a right to the
reward of his industry or to the profit of his capital he must hold
it with the strong hand or abandon all further industrial effort
and prey upon others as the lawless preyed upon him. But because human foresight and human wisdom is imperfect there
must always be some imperfections in the law. In order to give
effect to the paramount legal concept of peace and order instead
of battle and violence it is necessary that to a considerable extent
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those who have acquired possession of the objects of wealth, such
as lands and goods or the means of purchasing them, should be
secure, after a lapse of time, against violent or fraudulent dispossession, no matter how these lands and goods were in the first
instance acquired. It would be utterly impossible to make any
other orderly regulations, and any other plan would only result
in inviting and stimulating that violence and disorder which the
law was invented to suppress. There are many examples of this
following wars and confiscations. Accordingly at the next stage
of legal development the concept of property will be found paramount and comprehensive and second only to the prevention of
disorder and violence.
Bascom says :9 "Property rights have always gained a defense
in advance of personal rights. Personal rights have been treated
in the outset as a branch of property rights. An injury to a
person was redressed by a fine and the family or the community
was conceived as having a kind of ownership in the lives and
strength of its members. The property conception as itself more
definite has been used to give definiteness to personal rights."
In this way the right of one man to the labor of another without
consent of the latter, but founded upon status, was the foundation
of the world-wide legal relation of master and slave, and the law
regarded the right of the master to the slave and his labor as
property, -contenting itself with imposing duties upon the master
with respect to the sale, treatment or manumission of his slave.
Fichte observes that the right to administer laws, to decide causes,
to collect taxes, or to govern a territory was once considered
property, inheritable and devisable and capable of transmission by
sale or consent. So the early law recognized the power and
jurisdiction of a king as a sort of property right. Wives and
daughters were property, the daughter, but not the wife, an
object of barter or sale, and even within our own times the wrong
done to a father by seduction of his daughter can only be redressed by an action for loss of her services, and the same view
gave the husband an action for alienation of the affections of his
wife because he had a property right to her services, but denied
to the wife any redress for a similar wrong upon her because she
had no such property right. The present tendency of the law is
to enlarge and vindicate personal rights and to preserve property
rights, but to limit them within their proper bounds.
9Bascom on Sociology 15x.
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Where economic conditions are static or normal, we find the
law in a like condition. Changes are few and come about slowly
by legislation or by the gradual extension of the law through
judicial decisions to conform to customs based for the most part
upon economic conveniences and desires. But economic science
is not always and perhaps not often in advance of law. It is
the economic fact that precedes and produces the law, not the
science of economics as understood or promulgated at the time
by those learned in that science. When economic science was
understood and defined by the so-called mercantile school of
economists as the science of exchanges or the science of the
distribution of wealth, the thoughts of the more advanced and
intelligent judges and lawyers also took this color. They believed
like the then existing school of economists, that everything that
facilitated trade and exchange with foreign nations and enabled
one country to sell abroad in large proportion and purchase little
made greatly for increase in national wealth and consequently
for individual prosperity. The effect of this school of thought
on the law was to facilitate the adoption into the law of the
customs of merchants which thereafter remained part of the law
and to induce the passage of absurd laws prohibiting the purchase
of goods abroad or the sending of money out of the country, which
were thereafter abandoned.
(Concluded in next issue.)

